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RECIPROCITY IN THE FTAA: THE ROLES OF 
MARKET ACCESS, INSTITUTIONS AND NEGOTIATING CAPACITY 




The benefits of the FTAA to Latin American countries will materialize through two 
channels: improved access to the region's markets, and enhanced growth prospects 
through the strengthening of basic economic institutions. Furthermore, the importance 
of these negotiations is heightened by the fact that they are taking place against the 
failure of the Uruguay Round to liberalize agricultural trade, and the lack of progress 
in the ongoing negotiations of the Doha round. Under these conditions for Latin 
American countries, who are net exporters of different bundles of agricultural products, 
the FTAA could be the best opportunity for accelerating growth in the region. The 
analysis includes a discussion of these issues stressing the fact that in order for the 
reciprocal exchange of concessions agreed in the FTAA to result in an important 
liberalization of intra-regional trade, Latin American countries will have to negotiate 




Latin America has supported the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) because it sees this 
project as a way of creating the conditions for improved growth performance and declining poverty. 
In searching for these objectives with effectiveness, this paper calls attention to some of the 
conditions that are necessary in order for individual countries to internalize important benefits from 
the FTAA. While for any given country every bilateral and regional outcome of these negotiations 
will have its own unique set of economic effects, in this paper I focus attention on the negotiations 
between Latin American and the United States. The reason lies in the fact that, according to 
existing knowledge on the determinants of growth and convergence of per capita incomes, it is 
the outcome of this exchange of concessions that holds the promise of the most significant gains 
for Latin America. This paper argues that such a convergence is more likely to take place if: (1) 
the outcome of these negotiations is characterized by a reciprocal and a significant mutually 
beneficial exchange of market access concessions and, (2) Latin American countries strengthen 
some of their fundamental economic institutions. 
 
The order of presentation is the following. Section II recalls the central role that reciprocity has 
played in regional and multilateral negotiations. This is of particular importance because this 
principle was developed in the United States (US) in the early 1930s and later incorporated into the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a central element of the multilateral trade 
negotiations. Two interpretations of reciprocity are discussed in this section: a narrow and a broad 
interpretation which suggests that Latin America can profit from the FTAA through many channels 
____________ 
*  Consultant and Professor, School of Government, Universidad Di Tella, E-mail: jnogues@infovia.com.ar. 2 
of which trade is only one of them. Section III argues that the outcome of Uruguay Round (UR), 
which is the most important precedent of the FTAA negotiations, was unbalanced against the Latin 
American countries. This experience leaves important lessons for Latin America one of which is 
the need to negotiate with firmness. Section IV presents a condensed discussion of the likely 
implications of the US goals for the FTAA. This analysis suggests that in spite of the fact that the 
US has an ambitious negotiating agenda, Latin America has much to gain from the FTAA. Section 
V highlights the role of this agreement as a potential force in support of the strengthening of 
institutions in Latin American countries. Here is where a broad interpretation of reciprocity helps 
to understand gains of the FTAA that are over and above those associated with the exchange of 
market access concessions. Granted that this is the case, the final two sections of the paper are 
written with the idea that the higher the degree of intra-regional trade liberalization, the greater 
will be the benefits for the hemisphere. Section VI will discuss several elements that help to 
understand the handicaps of Latin American countries in the trade negotiations. This discussion 
points to the need of undertaking a major reassessment on how these countries can strengthen 
their capacities to negotiate with firmness. Finally Section VII, presents some suggestions for 
moving in this direction including the creation of an institutionalized mechanism for oversight of 
the trade negotiations. The paper also includes an appendix that presents suggestions for analytical 
work that could (should) be undertaken in order for the Latin American countries to understand 
better the economic impacts of the FTAA. 
 3 
II.  RECIPROCITY PRINCIPLE IN HISTORY AND PRACTICE 
This section will address two questions: What is the origin of "reciprocity" in international trade? 
and, How has this principle been applied in practice? The discussion will highlight the different 
meanings that have been attached to this concept. 
 
 
2.1.  Reciprocity in history 
Under the Hoover administration, the US Congress passed the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act of 1930. As a consequence of the upward adjustment to the US tariff structure introduced 
under this legislation, the average tariff rate reached an all time high. As is well known, this led 
to an implosion of US and world trade flows, deepening the recessionary effects of restrictive 
macroeconomic policies that were being implemented in order to sustain the gold standard (Temin 
[1999]). Shortly after taking power, President Roosevelt abandoned this standard under which US 
industrial output had fallen by around 50% between 1929 and 1932. Together with this critical 
decision, several other significant economic and social policies were implemented. In relation to 
trade policy, under the leadership of Cordell Hull then Secretary of State, the US Congress passed 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, creating with it the opportunity for the world trading 
system to come out of the recession and restore economic growth (Destler [1992]). 
 
This Act authorized the Executive to sign and implement trade agreements with other countries. In 
doing this, Congress delegated to the Executive its authority over tariff policy, it is mandated to 
oversee by the Constitution. By 1945 shortly before the creation of the GATT, the US had signed 
thirty-two reciprocal agreements granting tariff concessions on 64% of dutiable imports (Dam 
[2001]). A couple of years later, the concept of trade reciprocity that had been so successful in 
restoring growth to the US and world economy, was included as a central element of the multilateral 
negotiations under the aegis of the GATT. In effect, its Preamble stresses the importance of 
"entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers".
1 
 
As is known, the result of these multilateral negotiations has been an extraordinary liberalization 
of industrial countries' trade policies particularly in manufactured products. Bhagwati ([1990], p. 3) 
reminds us that: "In the United States, the average tariff declined by nearly 92% over the 33 years 
spanned by the Geneva Round of 1947 and the Tokyo Round". 
 
What are the reasons for the success of reciprocity in making the international trade negotiations 
a machine of liberalization? The critical element was the shift in the balance of power between 
different economic groups. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act had moved this balance in favor of 
import-competing industries. Not only was the balance of domestic pressure groups in favor of 
protection but also, the mechanics of trade policy decisions was tilted against liberalization. As 
Dam ([2001], p. 42) puts it, under Smoot-Hawley: "industries were able to logroll their way to 
victory because each tariff item came up for separate vote and exporting interests were unable to 
show in practical terms that any one tariff increase would lead to a reduction in their own exports". 
____________ 
1  Article XXVIII bis of the GATT on trade negotiations repeats this goal. 4 
In contrast to this situation, under the reciprocal trade agreement act, it became easier for exporters 
to defeat protectionist legislation through trade negotiations. Finger and Winters ([2002], p. 50) 
explain the balance of power under reciprocity in the following way: "Reciprocity has been a 
motivating principle of the GATT/WTO system. While the economics of import restrictions 
recognizes that the domestic losses from a country's own restrictions exceed domestic gains, the 
politics has not find a way to enfranchise the domestic interests who bear these losses -import 
users including consumers and downstream industries. Taking up trade policy as an exchange of 
domestic restrictions for foreign restrictions amplifies the voice of export interests. The success 
of the GATT/WTO system manifests the ingenuity of reciprocally agreed liberalization to transfer 
political power over domestic import restrictions to export interests". 
 
Summing-up, at least from the early 30s the political system of the United States has not approached 
trade liberalization as a unilateral policy. This liberalization has been possible only as the outcome 
of exchanging market access concessions in bilateral, regional or multilateral trade negotiations. 
In contrast, much of the liberalization implemented by developing countries including those in 
Latin America, has been implemented unilaterally (see for example Loser and Guerguil [1999]). 
 
 
2.2.  Reciprocity in practice: Experience of Latin America and the US 
Did the reciprocity principle as applied in international trade negotiations, achieved a balanced or 
reciprocal exchange of concessions? In discussing this question it is of interest to highlight the 
different meanings that have been associated with "reciprocity". To start, it is of interest to recall 
that neither the 1934 US Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act nor the GATT defines the meaning of 
"reciprocity" or of the "mutually advantageous" concepts. As Finger and Winters ([2002], p. 51) 
put it, the: "logic of the GATT/WTO is that in the negotiations each member is sovereign to 
determine for herself if a proposed agreement is advantageous to her - to decide the criteria by 
which to identify the pluses and minuses, to apply those criteria by whatever formula she considers 
appropriate". 
 
While this is the case, it is still of interest to recall some evidence indicating that up to the Uruguay 
Round, the exchange of trade concessions agreed during the first seven multilateral rounds appears 
to have been quite balanced. One first piece of evidence comes from average tariff rates. In fact, 
for the countries that actively engaged in trade negotiations during these rounds, the evidence 
indicates that having started from very high protection levels in the years immediately following 
the end of WWII, today their average tariffs are quite similar. For example, the post Uruguay 




A second piece of evidence comes from the mechanics agreed for exchanging concessions during 
the multilateral negotiations. While during the initial rounds, this mechanic relied to a great extent 
on the "principal supplier technique", the Kennedy and Tokyo round negotiations were concluded 
with an agreement to apply a common formula across the tariff structure (Hoekman and Kostecki 
____________ 
2  The concept that best applies is that of relative reciprocity in the sense that each country determines whether an 
agreement offers a balance between the rights and obligations it entails. Note that in some cases, such a balance has 
been reached even through special and differential treatment policies. 5 
[1995]). It is apparent that if all countries apply the same tariff reduction formula, the result is a 
balanced exchange of concessions. 
 
While the outcome over a long time span of many agreed exchange of concessions has been one 
of close balance, this apparently was not the case in every negotiation. In particular, during the 
initial GATT rounds, the US appears to have overlooked the issue of balance in order to achieve 
non-economic objectives. Why? In the words of Bhagwati ([1990], p. 40): "One can view the 
postwar period from either of two stylized perspectives. Either one can argue with Kindleberger 
(1981), that the United States played a leadership role in supplying the "public good" of a GATT 
regime oriented toward freer trade while letting "free riders"(such as Europe in the early years of 
GATT, and the developing countries), escape the burden of accepting symmetric market access 
obligations, or one can draw the inference that the United States was acting as the leader in the 
sense of sustaining GATT by permitting justifiable asymmetries of obligations for these nations 
on a temporary basis". 
 
More recently as will be argued in the next section, Latin American countries signed the Uruguay 
Round in spite of a clear imbalance in market access concessions against most of them. One cannot 
nevertheless conclude from here that these countries made an error in signing the multilateral 
agreements now in the World Trade Organization (WTO). In judging this issue, it is important to 
recall that these countries were coming out of decades of inward-looking policies and for the 
leadership of the late 80s and early 90s, it was important to bind the liberalization that was being 
implemented during those years. In this sense, the UR provided an opportunity to tie domestic 





In the history and in the practice of multilateral trade negotiations over many decades, the reciprocity 
principle played a crucial role of tilting industrial countries' political economy in favor of 
liberalization. The quantitative evidence that is available suggests that during the five decades of 
GATT reign, reciprocal international trade negotiations resulted in a significant liberalization of 
industrial countries' barriers to trade in manufactured products. This experience suggests that for 
Latin America, one can view the FTAA negotiations in either of two ways. The first is an agreement 
that should be judged in terms of balance in the exchange of market access concessions. This is 
the narrow interpretation of reciprocity. The second is an agreement that in addition, will help to 
strengthen the institutional infrastructure of Latin American countries and increase the prospects 
of higher growth. According to this view, the FTAA should also be seen as an opportunity for 
creating public goods in Latin America; the broad interpretation of reciprocity. The next section 
will offer a discussion of the Uruguay Round negotiations along the first of these interpretations 
or from the point of view of the narrow interpretation of reciprocity. As seen, this experience 
leaves important lessons for Latin America in its FTAA negotiations. 
  
 7 
III.  THE URUGUAY ROUND: EXAMPLE OF AN UNBALANCED OUTCOME 
The Uruguay Round is the salient example of an unbalanced negotiation in terms of the value of 
market access concessions given and received by developing countries. In the context of this paper, 
it is useful to recall some of the outstanding elements that account for the unbalance paying 
particular attention to some that are of particular importance to Latin America.
3 The Uruguay 
Round negotiations are the most significant precedent of the FTAA negotiations and therefore, 
the lessons from this experience are of relevance to the negotiations undertaken by the Latin 
American countries. 
 
I discuss the following topics: (i) the promise for the UR as stated in the 1986 Ministerial Declaration, 




3.1.  The UR promise 
Most qualified observers and multilateral institutions heralded the launching of the Uruguay 
Round in part because industrial countries accepted to include textiles, clothing and agricultural 
protection on the negotiating table. The expectation was that this Round would increase the 
market access opportunities faced by developing countries in developed country markets. The 
promise of these new trading opportunities and the lack of negotiating experience helps to 
understand why developing countries accepted an ambitious negotiating agenda that included 
several "new areas" that had not been the subject of negotiations in the previous MTNs such as 
services and intellectual property where comparative advantage is clearly on the side of industrial 
countries. Therefore, the grand exchange of concessions expected for this Round at its launching 
ceremony in 1986, can be characterized as one where Latin American countries would liberalize 
their markets in the new areas of interest to industrial countries in exchange for increased market 
access in agricultural and labor intensive manufactured products. What was the outcome? 
 
 
3.2.  The unbalanced UR outcome 
4 
In order to assess the outcome of the UR, in what follows I summarize some of the salient numbers 




3.2.1. Market access 
The outcome of the market access negotiations can be assessed in terms of: (i) the proportion of 
imports whose tariffs are bound and, (ii) the depth of the tariff cuts. Estimates show that developing 
____________ 
3  To be sure, the Uruguay Round also created benefits through the strengthening of a rule-based trading system and a 
revamped dispute settlement mechanism. Nevertheless, these benefits are shared by all WTO members and therefore in 
relation to other regions, I will argue, the net gains of the Uruguay Round to Latin American countries were lower. 
4  This subsection draws from Finger and Nogués [2002]. 8 
country tariff bindings increased significantly in the UR, and came close to the incidence of 
bindings that characterizes industrial countries which already was very high before these negotiations 
started (Blackhurst, Enders and Francois [1996]). However, one important difference is that most 
bindings by developing countries are at higher levels than applied tariffs.
5 
 
Regarding the proportional depth of the tariff cuts, that of developing has been far more important 
than that of industrial countries. The reason for this is that at the start of the UR, developing 
countries protected their markets more than industrial countries and furthermore, several of them 
were implementing significant unilateral liberalization programs. The proportional tariffs cuts 
indicates that developing countries' import prices declined by a higher percentage than those of 
industrial countries. 
 
In regard to non-tariff barriers, the analysis of this UR obligation shows that developing and 
industrial countries have generally complied with this obligation. In this area, there are no major 
differences between industrial and developing countries. 
 
Furthermore it is important to observe that while the liberalization agreed by developing countries 
have already been implemented, industrial countries' concessions still have to be completed (case 
of textiles and clothing liberalization coming due in 2005), or still has to be negotiated (case of 
agriculture). The market access concessions given by developing countries and driven mainly 
from unilateral liberalization efforts, have in many cases accelerated their trade and output growth. 
The dark side of the UR imbalance is not here, but in the continued protectionism of industrial 
countries in sectors of the greatest interests to developing countries and also to them as illustrated 
for example by the high consumer costs that they are paying (see for example, Hufbauer and 
Elliot [1994]). 
 
As illustrated by many studies, the costs to Latin American countries of this protectionism is very 
high (World Bank [2002] and Nogués [2003]). Because these countries' exports are heavily 
weighted with primary and agro-industrial products where industrial countries' liberalization was 
minimal, they are among the group that have suffered a particularly important unbalance from the 
Uruguay Round outcome Thus, while countries in Eastern Europe and the East Asia and Pacific 
region received tariff concessions covering 56% and 36% of their exports respectively, those 
from Latin America received concessions on only 22% of their exports (Finger, et al [1996]). 
 
The market access negotiations included topics where Latin American countries could expect to 
achieve some form of a balanced outcome. The promise that this would be the case is probably the 
most significant reason why they supported the UR negotiations. The fact that in these negotiations 
they did not achieve their goals implies that in the other topics where industrial countries appear to 
have comparative advantage, the imbalance could only be deepened. In what follows, I concentrate 
on implementation issues, services and "intellectual property". 
 
____________ 
5  As developing countries need to stabilize their trade policies, these bindings entail benefits even if unrequited. 
Nevertheless, according to tradition and the GATT rules, even in tariff bindings developing countries should stand firm 
and demand reciprocity. 9 
3.2.2. Implementation issues 
Implementation issues include the problems faced by many developing countries in trying to 
comply with some UR agreements such as the Agreement on Custom Valuation, the Sanitary and 
Phitosanitary Agreement, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, and the Agreement on 
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights. This experience calls attention to one significant 
factor that the Latin American countries cannot overlook in the FTAA negotiations, namely that 
of technical assistance. Among many other factors, the Uruguay Round outcome has been critized 
for not having included as a binding obligation of developed countries, the provision of technical 
assistance and financial resources in those areas other than market access, where these countries 
sought concessions from developing countries. In the FTAA negotiations, Latin American countries 
have much to gain from technical assistance provided by the US. For example with this assistance, 





In most services (not all), it is industrial countries that have the comparative advantage to supply 
them. For example, many services are essentially non-tradable and in order for them to be supplied, 
they require foreign direct investment. Statistics show that these FDI flows have come mainly 
from industrial countries. For these services that include areas such as power generation and 
distribution, gas distribution, telecommunications, water supply, finance etc., in the Uruguay 
Round industrial countries sought the "right of commercial presence" and many developing 
countries including from Latin America, binded important concessions of this type (Hoekman 
[1996] for a general analysis, and Nogués [2001a] for a more detailed discussion of Argentina). 
As a partial exchange to these valuable rights to "commercial presence", developing countries 
sought to achieve concessions in the area of "movement of persons" but so far, industrial countries 
have refused to negotiate this topic.
6 If their economic analysis concludes so, Latin American 
countries should continue to demand that in order to achieve a mutually beneficial exchange of 
concessions in the services negotiations of the FTAA, the US should consider ways for introducing 
greater flexibility to its existing rules on movement of persons (Winters, et al [2003]). 
 
 
3.2.4. Intellectual property: The case of patents for pharmaceutical drugs 
Against the opposition of several developing countries, developed countries pushed the "agreement" 
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This occurred against the lack of theoretical 
and empirical analysis showing that policy reforms induced by the TRIPS will increase world 
welfare, or the welfare of developing countries. 
 
____________ 
6  Note the abysmal imbalance between the multilateral rules that govern international capital movements -that in the 
FTAA negotiations are included in the negotiating group on investment-, the abundant factor of industrial countries, 
with those that govern labor movements, the abundant factor of poor countries including Latin America. 10 
TRIPS covers several "intellectual property" topics but given the size of the pharmaceutical market 
and the economic interests at stake, I concentrate remarks on patents for pharmaceutical drugs.
7 
The patent section of the TRIPS has more to do with the issue of appropriations of the rents 
generated in developing countries, than with concerns regarding their innovation and growth 
potential. In countries with a sizable share of the pharmaceutical market supplied by domestic 
companies like Argentina, Brazil and India, the introduction of patents will result in a significant 
transfer of rents to industrial countries' pharmaceutical companies (Nogués [1993] for early 
estimates, and World Bank 2002 for recent and global estimates).
8 
 
It is also of interest to recall that as late as the 70s and 80s, several industrial countries still did 
not provide patent protection to pharmaceutical drugs. For example, France introduced patent 
protection for pharmaceutical drugs in 1960; Germany in 1968; Japan in 1976; Switzerland in 
1977, and Sweden and Italy in 1978. In these countries, patents were introduced when the size of 
their pharmaceutical drug companies was such as to make the likelihood of drug innovation from 
investments in R&D high. Patent protection was implemented somewhere along the development 
process and it was always a domestic policy decision taken without regard to foreign interests. 
For developing countries after TRIPS, there is no such independence. For them the adjective has 




In section IV I show that as part of the FTAA negotiations, the US is seeking to strengthen the 
intellectual property laws of the region in order to achieve TRIPS plus regulations. This is another 
instance where reciprocal concessions in the FTAA negotiations will most likely not provide 
similar benefits to the Latin American countries. 
 
 
3.3.  Broken promises and principles 
The 1986 Ministerial Declaration that launched the Uruguay Round is an example of political 
correctness. Where promises had to be made they were made and where principles had to be listed, 
they were listed. The problem came later when the outcome of the negotiations showed that 
significant promises and principles had been broken. The lesson is that written promises are of 
____________ 
7  Pharmaceutical drugs is one of the industries for whom patent protection is important as an incentive for investing 
in R&D. Pharmaceutical drug companies have one of the highest ratios of R&D to sales and most drugs can be easily 
copied. Furthermore, because the all-inclusive costs of developing and marketing a new drug is in the order of 
hundreds of millions of dollars (some estimates suggest that this cost can be in the order of $500 millions dollars), 
domestic companies of developing countries simply don't have the size nor the resources to undertake R&D activities 
with a reasonable expectation of marketing one successful drug. Therefore in most Latin American countries there is 
simply no possibility that introduction of patent protection will foster investments in R&D in pharmaceutical drugs and 
the preliminary evidence suggests that this in fact is the case (Finger and Nogués [2002]). 
8  A recent estimate based on data for 2000, suggests that Argentina could end up transferring rents from granting 
patents to pharmaceutical drugs in the order of US$ 425 million per year (Nogués [2001a]). Since October 2000, 
when Argentina begun to grant these patents, these rent transfers have begun to increase. These estimates should 
now be reassessed in light of the Doha Ministerial Declaration on Access to Medicines (WTO [2001b]). 
9  Before the TRIPS, most developing countries granted patent duration of differing length and in some industries 
including pharmaceutical drugs, where the satisfaction of basic needs was an important consideration, they also 
distinguished between process and product patents. Clearly, different countries decided their structure of IPRs policies in 
terms of what they perceived to be in their interest. 11 
little help unless trade negotiators are prepared to stand firm by the letter. In the FTAA what in 
fact will matter is the capacity of countries to oversee that promises and principles be respected. 
Reminding some examples from the UR will help to illustrate. 
 
 
3.3.1. Promise of agricultural liberalization 
The 1986 Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este asserts that: "Negotiations shall aim to achieve 
greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring all measures affecting import access and 
export competition under strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines 
(…) by improving market access through inter alia, the reduction of import barriers…". The data 
and sources cited above indicate that this did not occur. What happened? 
 
Some of the core elements of the Agreement on Agriculture included: the substitution of non-
tariff barriers by ad valorem tariffs equivalents and for industrial countries, the reduction of these 
tariffs by 36%. Analysis undertaken on the substitution of NTBs with tariffs suggest that 
developed countries used the opportunity to declare base tariffs of their UR obligations that in 
general were higher, sometimes several times higher, than the ad valorem equivalents. In fact, 
there have been instances where the height of tariff declared to the WTO were such that their 
reduction by 36% would imply tariff rates that today are higher than the ones prevailing before 





On transparency, the 1986 Ministerial Declaration asserts that: "Negotiations shall be conducted 
in a transparent manner…". In many cases, transparency was not there. The agricultural dirty 
tariffs is one example. A second example is found in the implementation of the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC). While this Agreement has complied with the promise in the 
Ministerial Declaration that the textiles negotiation should seek "the eventual integration of this 
sector into GATT…", the obscure part has been in the implementation where some countries have 





On this, the Ministerial Declaration included the following language under Section B on "General 
Principles Governing Negotiations": 
____________ 
10  A puzzling question is why did the Cairns Group, that is heavily weighted by Latin American countries allow this to 
happen. This episode is I believe, one that the region should assess with greater care as it might provide some important 
lessons. 
11  The problem lies in the meaning given to the expression "integrate into the GATT" which is to certify that a textile 
or clothing product is clean of restrictions to trade that are illegal under the GATT. According to the ATC, the staged 
liberalization is measured against 1990 imports from a list of textile and clothing products that runs some thirty pages 
long. During the first stages, countries can choose which products in the list they "integrate into the GATT". This list 
includes the products where at least one industrial country has chosen to protect with GATT illegal instruments under 
the MFA. Since not all countries protected all of the products in the list, they can choose to integrate first those products 
which they were not protecting with quotas. As a result, so far liberalization by industrial countries has been smaller 
than the notional 33% that according to the ATC, should had been liberalized by now (Finger and Nogués [2002]). 12 
"Balanced concessions should be sought within broad trading areas and subjects to be negotiated 
in order to avoid unwarranted cross-sectoral demands". Furthermore, "...the developed countries 
do not expect the developing countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to make contributions 
which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs...". 
 
This section has argued that in the Uruguay Round reciprocity in the tradition of the first seven 




The UR was the first multilateral round where developing countries participated actively and the 
results show that even in market access concessions, they never came close to achieving a balanced 
exchange. Because of the particularly disappointing outcome of these negotiations on agriculture, 
Latin American countries who are net exporters of these products, came out with a more significant 
imbalance than many other regions of the world. Because these negotiations failed to reduce 
barriers for region's exports, its growth prospects did not improve. Clearly this negative experience 
should not be repeated.
12 One lesson is that in order for the FTAA negotiations to conclude with a 
significant reduction of barriers to market access, Latin America should negotiate with firmness; 




12  Why did Latin America signed to the Uruguay Round agreements? Part of the explanation could lie in the fact that 
this round was a single-undertaking and the GATT was subsumed in it. Therefore, not signing implied that the country 
was left out of the trading system including the GATT. Second, at the time, Latin America was implementing major 
reforms including structural adjustment policies. Under these special circumstances, signing to the WTO agreements 
offered an opportunity for the leaders of those days to lock-in some important elements of these reforms. Granted that 
these were powerful motives for signing, it is still the case that these agreements, particularly the Agreement on 
Agriculture, opened very few markets to the exports of the region and this has been very costly. 13 
IV.  US POSITIONS IN THE FTAA NEGOTIATIONS 
Having stressed the importance of reciprocity in international trade negotiations, in this section I 
discuss the prospects for a balanced outcome of the FTAA negotiations. The purpose here is to offer 
a brief discussion on the extent to which these negotiations will open new export opportunities to 
Latin America.




The US objectives for the FTAA are quite ambitious. I will start with agriculture, where the US is 
seeking to achieve conditional free regional trade within the Americas. I say conditional because 
according to the USTR the "…US does not consider export credits, export credit guarantees or 
insurance programs when provided consistent with WTO rights…" to constitute an export subsidy 
for the purpose of the FTAA agreement. I see in the general statement on the US agricultural 
objectives, an opportunity for strengthened cooperation with Latin American countries particularly 
within the region and in the multilateral negotiations. This is also made clear by the USTR when 
it asserts that it is important to cooperate "…among FTAA countries in the WTO negotiations on 
agriculture to seek the maximum possible improvement in market access opportunities, (…) and 
the multilateral elimination of export subsidies for agricultural products". Achieving free trade in 
agricultural and agro-industrial products in a similar way as the NAFTA did among its members, 
will provide substantial gains even if export subsidies and domestic assistance policies are not 
reduced (Monteagudo and Watanuki [2002]). It is true that subsidies can harm exports of some 





On services, the US wants this chapter to be "…comprehensive and should cover in principle all 
services sectors and services providers". Furthermore, in this same page, the USTR asserts that it: 
"…excludes immigration policy and access to employment markets from the scope of the services 
chapter of the FTAA agreement". Given the US strong comparative advantage in most services 
other than those provided by unskilled labor, if the outcome is close to what the US would like, 
then apparently this country is likely to gain more. Nevertheless, upon closer analysis, many of 
the services where the US demands an important liberalization from Latin America require domestic 
presence through foreign direct investment. Revitalizing these flows following the economic 
crisis that is affecting the region could will also be a source of economic gains. In any event, if 
temporary movement of workers would provide important benefits as suggested in the literature 




13  My objective here is not to provide a detailed analysis of the negotiating positions of different countries on different 
issues but to offer illustrative comments on the extent to which some negotiating positions are likely to result in a 
balanced or unbalanced exchange of concessions. The comments are based on the positions of the US as summarized 
in the web site of the USTR (http://www.ustr.gov). 14 
4.3. Government  procurement 
In the Chapter on government procurement, the US: "…seeks meaningful commitments to provide 
suppliers throughout the region with the opportunity to compete, on a non-discriminatory basis, 
for a broad range of government procurement contracts". Again research is needed on the pattern 
of comparative advantage to supply these contracts but given the magnitude of resources stationed 
abroad, my a priori is that the competitive edge in government procurement is on the side of the US. 
 
 
4.4. Intellectual  property 
For the chapter on intellectual property, the USTR asserts that "…FTAA countries will need to 
make adjustments to their intellectual property rights regime…". As a couple of examples illustrate, 
in this chapter the US is clearly seeking a TRIPS plus agreement. The US seeks to restrict the use 
of compulsory licenses by limiting the circumstances in which these can be issued. This objective 
collides head-on with the Doha Ministerial Declaration on medicines and public health (WTO 
[2001b]). On pharmaceutical drugs, the USTR seeks to require "…FTAA countries to grant 
pharmaceutical patent holders an extension on the term of their patents for any unreasonable delay 
in obtaining marketing approval...". As argued in the appendix, these and other US proposed 
regulations are likely to increase the transfer of rents from patent monopolies in Latin American 
countries to the right holders in the US. 
 
 
4.5. Other  issues 
These negotiating groups plus the one on market access cover the bulk of border and non-border 
policies that will affect the flow of goods and services among the FTAA countries. Other groups 
address negotiations on trade rules (dispute settlement, investment regulation, antidumping and 
countervailing measures), while still others address the newer issues of trade and environment, 
and trade and labor rights both of which remain contentious. The salient USTR goal mentioned 
for these last couple of topics is to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the US does not 
fail to enforce its environmental and labor laws. The Latin American countries remain seriously 
suspicious on whether the negotiations on these topics, might end harming them through for example, 




In a nutshell, the US has presented a clear statement of the objectives that it is seeking to achieve 
in the FTAA negotiations. The brief comments indicate that in several areas it seeks WTO plus 
regulations. Some of these like those listed for the agricultural and services negotiations, will be 
welfare enhancing for all the FTAA countries. Others like those on intellectual property, trade and 
environment and trade and labor, are less clear on the gains they can provide to the Latin American 
countries. As indicated in the appendix, in these and other areas, research is urgently needed. 
 
On the other hand, two issues suggest that the FTAA is likely to represent the best broad trade 
agreement that Latin America could sign in the next couple of years. First, given that the region is 15 
a net agricultural exporter, achieving free hemispheric trade in these products would represent a 
major achievement in a situation where the difficulties of moving along these lines in the Doha 
negotiations, robs the world economy of the opportunity to shift to a more liberal trading system 
(Nogués [2003]).
14 The strength and cohesion that the FTAA will take in favor of multilateral 
liberalization of agriculture is difficult to predict but clearly, a continent that has associated rich 
and poor countries in favor of such an outcome will have greater force than either alone. The 
second potential gain of importance for Latin America is in the area of institution-building and 
strengthening. Linking these economies to that of the US opens a unique opportunity for improving 
the growth prospects of the region not only through direct trade effects but also through indirect 
effects associated with predictable economic institutions. The overall balance therefore suggests 
that the FTAA should continue to be strongly endorsed by Latin America but as indicated below, 
more determination will be required in order to maximize its gains. I turn now to a discussion of 




14  Currently the region already has a web of trade agreements with several trade diversion effects and complicated 
and protectionist rules of origin (Estevadeordal [2002]). The FTAA promises to eliminate many of these impediments 
to intra-regional trade.  
 17 
V.  THE POVERTY AND INSTITUTIONAL ROLES OF THE FTAA 
Research undertaken during the last ten to fifteen years has shown that per capita growth is 
positively correlated with income growth of the poorest segment of the population. More concretely, 
econometric analysis looking at the experience of many countries over several decades have shown 
that a 1% improvement in per capita income is positively associated with a similar improvement 
in the income levels of the poorest 20% of the population (Dollar and Kraay [2001]). Obviously, 
this relationship, shows important variability indicating the existence of cases where economic 
growth has not been associated with a reduction in the incidence of poverty. These are cases 
where economic growth has been accompanied with a worsening in the distribution of income. 
Note that even in these instances either growth has to be slow or the distribution of income has to 
deteriorate significantly in order for poverty not to decline.
15 
 
If growth is a fundamental pillar that sustains the fight against poverty, then the question that has 
to be asked is which are the policies that promote it. The answer coming out of the most recent 
literature is that growth is promoted by opening-up policies with the rest of the world, and by 
stable and predictable institutions. During many years, the debate over the links between openness 
and growth did not come to a clear conclusion and an important part of the problem was the 
difficulty in measuring openness. For example, many studies measured openness with variables 
such as average tariff rates when in fact many other policies also determine the degree of integration 
of an economy with the rest of the world (see for example, Sachs and Warner [1995]). 
 
Another source of difficulty in measuring the links between openness and growth is that trade 
liberalization policies are usually accompanied by other structural reforms such as the lifting of 
barriers to investment flows. Finally and most importantly, the degree of openness has been found 
to improve growth mainly when countries have strong institutions including respect for the rule 
of law, high bureaucratic quality, low levels of corruption, minimal risk of expropriation and 
minimal risks of the government repudiating its contracts. In econometric studies, measures of 
institutional strength provide a clear and strong explanation of economic growth and of differences 
in the levels of per capita income across countries (Hall and Jones [1999]). 
 
This literature adds an important dimension to the discussion of the benefits and costs of the 
FTAA. To the extent that it will become a force in favor of stronger institutions in Latin American 
countries there is an added benefit, perhaps a very important one, for the region.
16 In particular it is 
of interest here to bring into the picture a few comments on the literature studying the characteristics 
of the convergence path of poorer countries and regions that have integrated themselves with richer 
countries or regions. This topic is of particular interest to the analysis of the potential effects on 
Latin American countries following their integration with the US economy. 
 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995], and Ben-David [1996] find clear evidence of this convergence for 
poorer regions of the US, and for European countries. In a recent paper, Berg and Krueger [2003] 
____________ 
15  China for example, is the developing country where income distribution has worsened significantly but growth has 
been so strong that it has taken 200 million people out of poverty. 
16  Obviously this effect should be stronger in countries like Argentina that starting in early 2002, violated many contracts 
and unilaterally declared default. 18 
summarize these findings in the following way. Regarding the contribution of Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, their analysis finds that over: "long and relatively stable periods, poorer regions converged 
to richer ones at a rate of about 2% per year". Regarding Europe, the finding is that: "convergence 
among the main European countries only became marked after 1958, once the trade liberalization 
associated with the European Economic Community took place". 
 
Poorer regions of the US and poorer countries of the EEC were closely integrated with their 
richer partners not only in terms of trade flows but also in terms of institutional infrastructure and 
factor movements. The FTAA model is certainly not about tying countries together with the same 
degree of intensity in terms of trade and institutions as the examples just indicated. Nevertheless, 
it is an important step in that direction particularly in a world where the multilateral system is not 
being successful in liberalizing agricultural markets. The literature on convergence suggests quite 
strongly that whether the FTAA will become a positive force for stronger growth of Latin American 
countries depends not only on the extent of intra-regional trade liberalization but also and perhaps 
more importantly, on the extent to which these countries strengthen their economic institutions.
17 
 
Despite the fact of significant gains of the FTAA that may not necessarily flow through traditional 
trade channels, it is still true that the greater the degree of trade integration among the countries 
in the region, the stronger is growth likely to be.
18 In this regard, the greater the negotiating capacity 
and determination of Latin America at the negotiating table, the more open will the FTAA end up 
being. Therefore, in the final sections I want to concentrate on issues and recommendations that 




17 Greece for example, joined the EU in 1981 but its economy did not show convergence of per capita incomes. An 
analysis undertaken by the World Bank suggests that this occurred because: "Greece did not implement the necessary 
reforms after joining the EU" (World Bank [2000] p. 51). 
18  Nevertheless, recent research shows that more than just goods and services move through trade flows. Recently 
for example, Schiff, Wang and Olarreaga [2002] have shown important productivity gains for Mexico after the formation 
of NAFTA. The FTAA opens the possibility for other countries in the region to also accelerate their total productivity 
growth. 19 
VI.  STRENGTHENING LATIN AMERICA'S NEGOTIATING CAPACITIES 
19 
In this section, I summarize some of the handicaps that developing countries face in the international 
trade negotiations. Certainly not all of these handicaps characterize every Latin American country 
but some could be quite general. Further research is needed in order to arrive at more precise 
findings. In what follows I will discuss handicaps associated with the following issues: (1) experience 
and domestic managerial arrangements, (2) the pros and cons of negotiating as a member of a 
trade agreement, (3) lack of knowledge on economic impacts of reciprocal concessions in different 
areas and, (4) the importance of private-public sector linkages. 
 
 
6.1.  Experience and management arrangements 
The Foreign Affairs Ministries of many Latin American countries are responsible for the international 
trade negotiations including those of the FTAA. Is this an adequate institutional arrangement? 
Some comments suggest that it may not be the best arrangement. First, in the new agenda of trade 
negotiations, tariffs and non-tariffs barriers to trade is only one of the items on the table. Had trade 
negotiations remained focused on these barriers, the decision on which ministry is responsible for 
the negotiations would had not been that serious. But as seen, the negotiating agenda that has been 
expanded considerably since the Uruguay Round to include a number of topics where concessions 
granted sometimes may result in net costs and concessions received in these same areas could turn 
out to be of little or no value. Diplomats have not been trained to assess the economic dimensions 
of the increasing number of items that are being included in most negotiating agendas and as a 
consequence, they are more likely to agree to unbalanced outcomes.
20 
 
Second, most career diplomats are lawyers by training and they do not necessarily share the same 
kind of concerns that economists might have as they observe a negotiation lacking reciprocity. 
Reaching agreement in a negotiation is usually higher in the ranking order of priorities of the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry, than walking away from a meeting because a balanced and mutually 
beneficial negotiation is not being reached. Such "undiplomatic" action is more likely to occur when 
those sitting on the other side of the table have "political clout" i.e. usually industrial countries. 
 
Third, the structure of incentives in their careers, implies that diplomats usually are keen to obtain 
a foreign assignment as local wages are lower than those they receive abroad. Under these 
circumstances, it is a challenge to train diplomats with the goal of transforming them in the elite 
negotiating group of the country. As career diplomats, sooner or later they will want to leave for a 
foreign assignment. 
 
Finally, as said above, most Latin American countries have relatively little experience with 
international trade negotiations. I have no doubts that over time career diplomats will gain experience 
____________ 
19  This section draws from Nogués [2001b]. 
20  Obviously, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is advised by other government offices. The problem here is that these 
other offices also have no experience in dealing with trade negotiations and often they feel removed from the long-run 
consequences of the advise they may give. In practice therefore, except for institutionalized interactions with the Ministry 
of Economy, in the absence of instructions from other Government agencies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can decide 
by default. 20 
but say ten years from now, most of the international negotiations now under way will most likely 
have been concluded and the experience gained by then, may come too late. 
 
 
6.2.  Pros and cons of negotiating as a member of a regional agreement 
In the FTAA negotiations several Latin American countries are participating as members of regional 
trade agreements. This has one strength and one handicap. On the positive side, negotiating as a 
group increases the strength of the demands and this is particularly significant when some of the 
important economies have still many concessions to bind at the WTO. This is the case for example 
of Brazil in services and thus within the MERCOSUR, this country has a relatively strong 
negotiating position vis à vis the US. Obviously, the extent to which this edge is of value to the 
other members, also depends on the capacity of Brazil to internalize the gains from the concessions 
it will be giving. 
 
On the negative side, there are difficulties of arriving at common negotiating positions for a group 
of countries than for single countries. First, Latin American economies are still relatively volatile 
and at a given point in time, different members of a preferential trade arrangement (PTA) will be 
at different points of their economic cycles; this is likely to affect protectionist demands differently 
in the member countries. Things are made worse when there are serious macroeconomic divergences 
as was the case during 2001 and 2002 among the MERCOSUR countries. 
 
Finally, the differential structure of the economies is still another obstacle to arriving at a common 
negotiating position. For example within the MERCOSUR, Paraguay and Uruguay are more 
specialized economies than Argentina and Brazil which shows for example, in the concentration 
of trade. Thus, while in 2000 the first five products accounted for 28% of Argentina's exports to the 
EU, in the case of Uruguay they accounted for 49%.
21 The consequence of this, is that Paraguay 
and Uruguay are willing to close a trade deal with a fewer number of concessions received than is 
the case for Argentina and Brazil. While a few quotas and tariff concessions might create important 
export opportunities for the first two countries, for Argentina and Brazil, it takes more to arrive at 
an attractive deal. 
 
 
6.3.  Knowledge and trade negotiations 
There are piles of econometric studies arguing that the gains to developing countries from their 
own and their trading partners' liberalization policies are in the billions of dollars. In my view 
there are two problems with using these studies to entice countries to participate in international 
trade negotiations. First, when compared to the observed outcomes, the prediction from many of 
the forecasting models have been quite out of the mark (see for example, Francois [2001]). Second, 
these models cannot capture the some dimensions of the complex economic realities of individual 




21  On the MERCOSUR-EU negotiations, see Devlin [2000]. 21 
As a consequence, in my view there is no alternative to that of undertaking country-specific 
microeconomic or sectoral analysis of the costs and benefits associated with different packages 
of concessions. Thus, if for any given Latin American country, one likely outcome of the FTAA 
negotiations will be reciprocal market access concessions in say goods, services, intellectual 
property and government procurement then, probably the most accurate way of finding whether 
this is a mutually beneficial outcome, is for each country to undertake the necessary economic 
analysis. For trade in goods, the meaning of a balanced exchange is quite straightforward but 
in other areas including services, intellectual property and a host of other issues, the impact of 
reciprocal concessions is not that clear. 
 
In the absence of knowledge on country-specific economic effects, the Latin American countries 
are negotiating blindfolded. In this area, more research is urgently needed. This contrasts with the 
situation of industrial countries including the US that apparently know with precision what they 
want to achieve in the negotiations. These specific objectives are defined in close consultations 
with interest groups and in many cases, they are supported by a good understanding of economic 
costs and benefits. As illustrated next, this knowledge comes not only from academic research 
but also from government-financed analysis and what is probably most important, from a long 
experience of close collaboration and exchange of ideas between the private and public sectors. 
 
 
6.4.  Private sector-public sector linkages 
Latin American countries have practically no tradition of holding consultations among public offices 
and between the public and private sectors for defining positions to be taken at the international 
trade negotiations. As said, in the Uruguay Round for example, the Latin American countries 
appear to have acted more from the basis of unilateral reforms than from the basis of negotiating 
an exchange of concessions. Thus, the UR did not serve as an experience to strengthen inter-agency 
and inter-sectoral communications for the trade negotiations. This I believe is a serious handicap. 
First, without a good private-public sector communication line, the Government cannot be sure 
about the strength of the political support it has when defining specific negotiating strategies. 
Second, lack of political support from the private sector weakens the negotiating position of the 
country vis à vis other countries that negotiate on the basis of a clear consensus (Odell [2000]). 
 
Compare this with the apparent situation in the US. Thus for example, Dam [2001] notes the 
importance of lobbying and political action committees (PACs). Lobbying Dam asserts: "…is a 
growth industry. In 1998 expenditures on federal lobbying increased 13% to more than $1.4 billion 
dollars; the number of registered lobbyists reached 20,512 in 1999. That amounts to 38 registered 
lobbyists and $2.7 million in lobbying expenditures for every member of Congress!" (Ibidem, p. 
11). Although only a fraction of this lobbying is related to trade issues, the numbers and their 
trends illustrate an economy where politics and economic interests are well informed of each 
others activities. Trade interests are also advanced through PACs which channel an important 
fraction of private money to political campaigns. According to Dam, the number and importance 
of contributions by PACs is also growing fast. 
 
Add to this aggressive campaigns by different sectors. One example cited by Dam is the TV 
campaigns at the time of the 1997 Congressional discussions for renewal of the fast track. The 
AFL-CIO defined this renewal as one decision that would result in job losses while the Clinton 22 
administration defined it as an opportunity for economic growth. In the end, the AFL-CIO won 
and Clinton conceded that "According to every public opinion survey, I have completely failed to 
convince a substantial majority of American people of the importance of trade to our economic 
development" (Ibidem, p. 17). Something similar could end up happening in several Latin American 
countries when the time of approval of the FTAA is submitted to a vote by the Parliaments. 
 
In addition, the negotiating resources at the disposal of the US Government for trade matters that 
are available in the Department of Commerce, in the USTR, in the International Trade Commission 
and in the United States Department of Agriculture among others, are very important. For example, 
there is no important trade negotiation that is closed without a serious economic evaluation of the 
consequences of its outcome for the US economy. These studies are usually undertaken by the 
International Trade Commission but other State Departments usually collaborate. 
 
In short, the inter-agency communications and the close private-public sector linkages ensure that 
when the US trade negotiators sit at the table, they have a good grasp of the economic effects of 
the issues at stake and what is more important, they have a clear political support from the private 
sector. The following quote in reference to the FTAA negotiations is illustrative of the strength of 
these linkages: "The US positions were developed with input from the full range of federal 
executive branch agencies (…) Advise from non-governmental sources has been obtained primarily 
through the formal private sector advisory committee system (…) The US International Trade 
Commission has performed the economic analysis of the probable economic effects of an 
agreement" (http://www.ustr.gov). I believe most Latin American countries have still to build and 
strengthen these crucial linkages. Not doing this is equivalent to weakening the arguments of their 





Developing countries including those from Latin America bring to the negotiating table, what 
appears to be serious structural handicaps. In some cases, they simply don't have the resources 
that are necessary even to attend the discussions. This extreme example of "unequal exchange 
capacity" characterized the situation of several least developed countries during the Uruguay 
Round negotiations (Blackhurst, Lyakurwa and Oyejide [1999]). Apparently these countries were 
asked to sign by the cross and were told that at a later date they would receive technical assistance 
explaining them what it was all about.
22 
 
While more advanced developing countries including some in Latin America are in a better 
resource position, they are also handicapped from what appears to be other weaknesses including: 
(i) relatively short negotiating experience, (ii) inadequate management arrangements, (iii) difficulties 
in reaching consensus among members of regional trade arrangements, (iv) lack of knowledge 
of probable economic effects of exchanging concessions on the vast array of issues on the 
negotiating table, (v) weak inter-agency coordination, and weak public-private sector coordination 
____________ 
22  In many cases, this assistance never materialized and still today the WTO is struggling to get even a small increase 
in resources for technical assistance programs and is having great difficulty in meeting this goal. 23 
and communication lines and, (vi) a negotiating agenda that continues to increase in terms of 
complexity. 
 
If Latin American countries can strengthen some of the above-mentioned areas, they will be in a 
stronger position to demand reciprocity where it corresponds. They will also be in a better 
position to put on the negotiating table, the topics that are of their interest and if they cannot 
prevail, at least they will be better prepared to assess the consequences of alternative outcomes. 
All this would be for the benefit of a superior FTAA. 
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VII.  CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS 
I have argued that the Uruguay Round, the most significant precedent for the FTAA negotiations, 
was seriously unbalanced against Latin America. In relation to this outcome and the ongoing Doha 
negotiations, the FTAA promises to open markets to the products where Latin America has clear 
comparative advantage namely, agricultural and agro-based manufactures. In this regard, the FTAA 
probably represents the best opportunity for accelerating growth through trade in the region. 
 
In order for maximizing openness in the FTAA, I have also argued that Latin America has to 
negotiate with determination. In this regard, I have indicated the sources of some handicaps at the 
negotiating table and I want to conclude this paper by offering some suggestions that might assist 
Latin American countries to achieve the goal of maximizing openness within the FTAA.  
 
 
7.1.  Reciprocity in the FTAA 
The Uruguay Round opened a divide in the trading system in such a way that we can talk of the 
"before" and "after" it. The GATT trading system, in which developing countries did not participate 
much, was more transparent and balanced than the WTO system. In the old system, the weaker 
countries could feel quite assured that the hegemonic countries would not abuse of their power. 
This appears to be no longer the case and now differences in resources, in experience, in managerial 
capacity, in knowledge, and in negotiating strength matter. It would appear that one way of 
modifying at least partly the outcome of trade negotiations, would be to go back to respect the 
fundamental GATT principle of negotiating on the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefits. This 
appears to take particular importance in the context of the FTAA negotiations as it was the US 
who developed, protected and cherished this principle for more than fifty years. Latin American 
countries appear to have a strong argument here and the challenge is how to make this operational. 
This takes me to the next couple of suggestions. 
 
 
7.2. Standing  firm 
When in doubt, Latin American countries should stand their ground to have the courage to insist 
that all reasonable doubt be removed as to the economic effects of different items of the FTAA 
before they sign anything that is clearly not a gain for them. This is a defensive strategy that, if 
repeated every time there is a "reasonable doubt", should eventually generate forces in favor of 
rebalancing the odds in trade negotiations. 
 
 
7.3. Congressional  oversight 
I have argued that many countries in the region have given the responsibilities for the international 
trade negotiations to their Foreign Affairs Ministries. I have also argued that many, certainly not 
all, of these Ministries are ill-equipped for meeting this challenge successfully. This implies that 
several countries are assuming risks that are higher than necessary which in turn worsens the 
likelihood of achieving a mutually beneficial exchange of concessions in the FTAA negotiations. In 
these circumstances, the Congress of the Latin American countries could assume the responsibility 26 
of ensuring that the negotiations undertaken by the Executive Power are balanced and in fact, 
result in a mutually beneficial exchange of concessions for their countries. Such an action would 
not only ensure a better outcome but would also strengthen the negotiating capacity of the Latin-




In addition to "blocking" and introducing Congressional oversight committees into the trade 
negotiations, Latin American countries should look into their negotiating arrangements. In some, 
there appears to be room for improving the management and skills allocated to the negotiations. 
They should also increase their internal cohesiveness by internal alia, strengthening the public 
sector-private sector consultation process. Again, a strengthened public and private sector linkage 
provides a more clear negotiating mandate to the Executive Power and would also strengthen the 
position of the Latin American countries at the negotiating table (Odell [2000]). 
 
 
7.5. Economic  knowledge 
Additionally, with relatively few resources, Latin American countries can gain greater knowledge 
on economic impacts of the FTAA agenda. Some suggestions are presented in the appendix. It is 
important to recall that in much the same way as it relies on its mighty intelligence (academic and 
entrepreneurial), the US has a tradition of listening and considering arguments that are supported 
by serious research. Unfortunately, Latin America has little or no tradition of negotiating on the 




Finally, I want to conclude this paper by suggesting the importance of strengthening the training 
of trade negotiators. The literature presents many examples of successful and unsuccessful tactics 
used by different negotiators, from different countries, on different issues. Many of these examples 
have been studied carefully by some distinguished researchers who could address training courses. 
Likewise, exposing the regional trade negotiators to the experiences of other successful colleagues 
like those that negotiated the NAFTA agreement for Mexico, could also provide important lessons. 
While this will not reduce the gap between the experience of the US and the Latin American 
countries in conducting trade negotiations, the learning to be achieved by exposing Latin American 





ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
The purpose of this appendix is to suggest studies that Latin American countries could undertake 
in order to determine the likely gains associated with different negotiating topics of FTAA. These 
studies can be classified in three broad thematic categories: (a) employment and macroeconomic 
effects; (b) analysis of economic effects related to reciprocal concessions in a number of relatively 
new areas and, (c) negotiations on regional trade rules. It should be underscored that because 
negotiations are dynamic and have a shifting focus of attention, the list of studies that I am 
proposing should be flexible to include additional topics along the negotiating process. 
 
The financial resources needed to undertake these and related studies should be within the resource 
constraints of the Latin American countries. I believe the down-side risks of this proposal is small 
in relation to the expected benefits. Finally, the suggestions are presented in a general format which 
means that once each country has decided on a specific list of subjects, only then will they be in a 
position to define the central questions to be studied under each study. 
 
 
1.  Employment and macroeconomic effects 
1.1.  Trade negotiations and employment 
The FTAA will have expansionary effects over some sectors and contractionary effects over others. 
Two salient questions in this regard are: Which is the likely net effect of these sectoral shifts of 
output on employment?. The analysis of this question should include not only comparative static 
effects but also, considerations on dynamic adjustment paths. The importance of this can be 
illustrated by the fact that it is likely that in 1993 few if any economic analysts predicted the 




1.2.  The FTAA and tax collections 
It is apparent that if the FTAA ends up having positive and important macroeconomic effects, 
aggregate tax collections will eventually rise. Nevertheless, it is also possible that some of these 
effects will materialize only with a lag and if this happens, the tariff reductions implemented for 
complying with the implementation of the FTAA could result in a temporary shortfall in tax revenues. 
Unless the country is well prepared to compensate for this shortfall, negative effects could appear 
for example, through increases in country risk associated with increasing budget deficits and/or 
the introduction of distortionary taxes. 
 
 
1.3. Agricultural  sector 
As mentioned, the US has confirmed that in the FTAA it is seeking to achieve free trade in 
agricultural products. In general terms, the American continent has comparative advantage in the 28 
production of these products as it is a net exporter, and therefore, the FTAA does not appear to be 
the agreement where Latin American countries could achieve a substantial increase in their 
agricultural exports. Nevertheless, recent research indicates the opposite and the reason appears 
to lie in the different structure of agricultural production associated with different resources and 
climatic conditions. Given the crucial importance of the FTAA agricultural negotiations, it seems 
important for the Latin American countries to analyze the specific products where the agreement 
is likely to foster trade. Likewise these countries must analyze how successive generous US Farm 
Bills could affect the objective of regional free trade in agricultural products. Finally, it is important 
to analyze whether the FTAA negotiations can strengthen the multilateral agricultural negotiations 
where the decisions of major importance for Latin America will be taken. 
 
 
2.  Services, government procurement and other new areas 
Generally speaking, it can be said that if the knowledge regarding the country-specific effects of 
the FTAA for trade in goods remains low, those related to the effects of negotiations in the new 
areas, is practically non-existent. As said, continuing along this path, is equivalent to negotiating 
blindfolded. 
 
Unlike the analytical tools available for the FTAA effects on trade in goods, the analysis of reciprocal 
concessions in the new areas such as services, government procurement, intellectual property, 
does not rest on such firm grounds. In spite of this, there are many ways by which studies of these 
areas could serve the interests of the Latin American countries in the FTAA negotiations. A few 




The starting point of the FTAA services negotiations are the concessions given and consolidated in 
the WTO as part of the Uruguay Round General Agreement on Services. In the FTAA negotiations, 
the US is seeking extended access to most types of services and in practically all of the four modes 
for delivering them that are specified in the articles of this Agreement. For any Latin American 
country that is seeking a balanced exchange of concessions it is important to estimate even if 
approximately, the gains to be achieved by foreign providers of services and those to be achieved 
by the domestic providers. To start making progress in answering this question the first step is to 
analyze which services the country has consolidated in the WTO and which services concessions 
can still be given as part of the FTAA negotiations. As a general rule, the Latin American region is a 
net importer of services, while the US is a net exporter of services. Therefore, liberalizing trade in 
services is more likely to benefit the US than the Latin American countries. If so, according to the 
reciprocity principle, these countries should be in a position to demand compensating concessions 
in other areas from the US. Alternatively, Latin America could negotiate greater flexibility in mode 
4 of the Agreement on Services: temporary movement of workers. But in order to argue any of 
these with force, the Latin American countries should build the economic analysis showing solid 
evidence. 
 
A serious problem in many Latin American countries with the services negotiations is that the 
statistics are either non-existent or seriously flawed. One example that I lived from close experience 29 
is the adjustment that were made to several items of Argentina's balance of payments accounts 
and published in 1999. The following table illustrates the adjustments made to the statistics on 
trade in travel services which is the most important services trade flow of many Latin American 
countries. Average differences in export revenues of 50% in trade statistics are a drawback for the 
trade negotiations.
23 One thing is to seat with trading partners to discuss liberalization in tourism 
services, for example hotel services, when your travel exports are $1.7 billions, and quite a 
different one is when the statistics show these revenues to be $813 millions as they appeared in 
1993 during the UR negotiations. Clearly in services trade, Argentina participated in the UR with 
quite bad statistics and it could very well be that in other Latin American countries, the accuracy 
of official statistics on services are also seriously flawed (see Whichard [1999]). 
 
 
PROPORTIONAL ADJUSTMENTS TO PREVIOUS ESTIMATES OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
STATISTICS ON TRADE IN TRAVEL SERVICES, ARGENTINA 1992-1998 
Account  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
        
Exports  47% 51% 52% 52% 52% 47% 46% 
Imports  18% 24% 24% 37% 35% 32% 31% 
        
Source: Finger and Nogués [2002]. 
 
 
Finally, there is the contentious issue of movement of persons where I believe that Latin America 
should stand firm in its demands. Nevertheless, to increase the likelihood of success in the FTAA 
negotiations on this issue, Latin American countries need to undertake studies on the distribution 
of the benefits of reciprocal concessions in services including and excluding liberalization of the 
existing regulations on the movement of persons. 
 
 
2.2. Government  procurement 
In Government procurement the US is demanding an ambitious liberalization. In these negotiations, 
the starting point between the US and Latin American countries is not similar. One of the few 
WTO plurilateral agreements is the Agreement on Government Procurement, which has been 
signed by most industrial countries, but most developing countries including those in Latin America 
have still not joined. In relation to these negotiations one important question to address refers to 
the differential comparative advantages of supplying goods and services to the governments of 
the other FTAA countries? Another important question for Latin American countries is how the 
opening of government procurement will impact on the small and medium enterprises that are 
now supplying their home-country governments? These and other questions could be addressed 
____________ 
23  This revision came as a result of a survey to tourists undertaken in 1996. This survey was complemented by new 
estimates of average daily expenditures of non-residents in Argentina. Ideally, these surveys should be undertaken 
every year but budgetary constraints preclude this. This situation contrasts with that in many industrial countries that 
can finance travel surveys every year and some as the US, even undertake samples on a monthly basis. These countries 
have significantly more accurate statistics on services than developing countries and therefore and in a much better 
position to assess the economic consequences of negotiating reciprocal exchange of concessions in this area. 30 
in country-specific studies with the aim of assessing even if approximately, whether reciprocal 
concessions in this area imply a balanced exchange of concessions. 
 
 
2.3. Intellectual  property 
While the Doha Ministerial Declaration on access to essential medicines has clarified several 
gray areas of the TRIPS agreement, this does not prevent the leading innovating countries to seek 
strengthened property rights in their regional agreements. Most if not all of the US proposals in 
this area will have a positive impact on the transfer of patent rents from Latin America to the US 
who together with Canada are practically the sole innovators in the FTAA. What amount of 
additional rents would be transferred as a consequence of extending the patent duration due to 
delays in marketing approvals? What benefits could the country receive in exchange for modification 
of patent legislation along US demands? These are the type of questions where applied economic 
analysis can shed light. 
 
 
3.  FTAA negotiations on trade rules 
Again the starting point of these negotiations include several of the WTO Agreements. As said, 
the Uruguay Round implied an important advance in the number and coverage of the regulations 
of the multilateral trading system. Some of these include the redrafting of all types of regulations 
that were included in the GATT such as the rules on dispute settlement, on antidumping, on 
subsidies on safeguards, etc. These are rules that in one way or the other, Latin American countries 
are familiarized with. Even so, these countries should become aware of the specific aspects of 
these important regulations that may be producing more harm to them, than benefits. It seems to 
me that in these areas, aggregate topic-specific studies and not country-specific studies should be 
the way of gaining knowledge for Latin America to be in a position to propose modifications to 
existing rules. For example, one area that has been a source of contention is the US antidumping 
and countervailing regulations. The aim of a regional study on these policies should be to propose 
least trade-distorting modification to the existing WTO rules with a view to harmonizing regional 
antidumping and countervailing regulations and mechanisms. 
 
Other WTO rules including those regulated by the Agreement of Technical Barriers to Trade and 
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures are newer to the Latin American countries. 
As a matter of fact, many of them have encountered problems with the implementation of these 
Uruguay Round Agreements. These are areas where a given structure of reciprocal concessions 
could provide benefits to all the countries in the region. For example, studies showing that US 
funded technical assistance for the implementation of these agreements would also over time, 
result in increased regional trade flows of the products covered by these rules. This would clearly 
be a win-win exchange of concessions but for this to materialize, research is needed in order to 
uncover in detail how to structure reciprocal concessions in this area. 
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